They’re not going away, you know

On Friday I chaired a panel at the annual conference of the Canadian Association of Slavists on the subject of the war in Ukraine. One theme which repeatedly came up was the need for dialogue between Kiev and the inhabitants of Eastern Ukraine in order to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. That, however, raised the question ‘dialogue with whom?’, and that is where the difficulties begin.

Many critics of the Ukrainian government have complained that it has repeatedly refused to engage in dialogue with the people of Donbass. The government’s supporters, however, respond that doing so isn’t easy. The collapse in February 2014 of the Party of the Regions, which had previously dominated Eastern Ukrainian politics, meant that Eastern Ukraine was left without leadership. There was at that point, it is said, nobody with whom the new authorities in Kiev could have held meaningful negotiations. As for now, the leaders of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR), Aleksandr Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky, allegedly lack any legitimate claim to speak on behalf of the people of Donbass.

Against this, others complain that while it might have been difficult for Kiev to find credible interlocutors in Donbass in the early stages of the conflict, it never even tried to do so. Nor is it trying today. There are, for instance, civil society groups operating in Donbass, some of them pro-Ukrainian (in the sense of wanting to remain part of Ukraine), but the Ukrainian government refuses to talk even to them, because although they are pro-Ukrainian they also demand political autonomy for Donbass. Were the authorities in Kiev to reach out to such people and make suitable political concessions, they might, it is claimed, find a way of bypassing the DPR and LPR authorities to get the support of the people of Donbass for a political settlement.

This last idea is, in theory, a good one, but I fear that it comes a year too late. Thirteen or fourteen months ago, when the DPR and LPR consisted of nothing more than a handful of people sitting in buildings in Donetsk and Lugansk, it might have worked. At that point in time, a concerted effort to find influential interlocutors, along with some timely and substantial political concessions, could have isolated the more radical elements from the mass of the population. In the terminology of Maoist insurgency theory, the government could have drained the sea in which the fishes swam. Now, that is no longer possible. Day by day the DPR and LPR acquire more and more of the attributes of real states. They have also amassed large armies, with tens of thousands of troops, as well as hundreds of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. The rebel republics have power, and people and institutions which have acquired power through bitter struggle don’t just give it up without getting something in return.

In this sense, the issue of whether Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky can legitimately claim to represent the people of Donbass is beside the point. Whatever the right and wrong of the matter, they have the guns. The Ukrainian government is incapable of defeating them by force. The only way it can regain its lost territories is through negotiation, and the people it has to negotiate with are those who control the rebel states. In saying this, I am not trying to make a moral comment about the worthiness or otherwise of the rebel cause. This is a purely practical conclusion. If Kiev wants to reunite its country in a peaceful way, sooner or later it is going to have speak to its enemies.



5 thoughts on “They’re not going away, you know”

  1. As far as I understood, Kiev went out of its way to imprison/house arrest etc. people in the east whom they believed to be possible opposition leaders.
    In a way they had a hand in creating the vacuum that got filled by adventurers like Strelkov later.
    Of course, given how maximalist Maidans demands were/are, and how unrealistic an EU joining actually is, expecting that the South East sacrifices their ties with Russia and their economy for a “EU Pipe dream” was always a “long shot”.

    What is surprising, and what actually speaks of the inefficiency of Russian “soft power” is that the rebellion was small. Far larger revolts historically happened over way smaller issues.


  2. Andrej, there were demonstrations ans even seizures of government buildings in a number of other cities (especially Kharkov). The crucial difference was weapons. Donetsk and Lugansk were the only two places where the protesters took the trouble to arm themselves. Their unarmed counterparts in Kharkov were cleared out and rounded up overnight. The people who seized power in Kiev quickly demonstrated that they were no pussycats like Yanukovich and were not going to mess around.
    Crimea also played a role in this – it created a belief that any autonomy, federalism etc. was only an intermediate stop on the way to separatism – Crimea was an autonomous republic and look where it got it. Thus the right approach was to crack down hard on any dissent, not to negotiate.


  3. Oleg Tsarev was a Ukrainian politician, and he could represent the republics. As far as I can tell, he seems to be an okay guy.

    He has been, however, accused of separatism and is wanted by the Kiev’s regime. Which is exactly where the problem lies: anyone who could represent the republics is, automatically, a criminal, “separatist”. Zugzwang.


Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s