An important document landed in the public sphere this week: the final report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR – a job long held by John Sopko).
I have mentioned SIGAR several times before, but for those not aware, he was the auditor appointed by the US government to check on what happened to the vast sums of money spend by the USA in Afghanistan. Over the years, he issued numerous reports detailing waste on a staggering scale. SIGAR’s work has now come to an end, and the final report sums up the findings of his office’s work over the past 20 or so years. Like SIGAR’s previous output, the final report is a damning condemnation of failed national building efforts. SIGAR concludes:
“The outcome in Afghanistan should serve as a cautionary tale for policymakers contemplating similar reconstruction efforts. If there is one overarching lesson to be learned from a tragedy that unfolded over 20 years, it is that any U.S. mission similar in context, scale, and ambition must confront the real possibility of failure.
The U.S. experience in Afghanistan demonstrates the need for sober assessments of what is achievable and what may be beyond the reach of an external intervention. Moreover, those tasked with deriving lessons from such endeavors should be wary of assuming that improvements in technique or tweaks in strategy can compensate for fundamental flaws in a mission’s premise. Without a realistic understanding of, and respect for, the constraints inherent in these situations, attempts to “fix” or refine the approach risk repeating the same mistakes while expecting different outcomes.”
IRRUSSIANALITY 